

Programs, Security and Games

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What this talk is about

Program security is a focal aspect of Security

Analyses boil down to producing rules on
observable program behaviour

We will see how game semantics can be used to
obtain accurate analyses

Program security: Why?

- Security very often concerns software
- Analyses can be very expressive
- Analyses supplemented with proofs/tools

Program security: What?

- Reachability
 - Safety, liveness
- Access control
 - resource access respects given policies
- Integrity
 - valuable data not changed undetectably
- Secrecy
 - secret information not revealed to some environment

Program security: What?

- Reachability
 - Safety, liveness
 - Access control
 - resource access respects given policies
 - Integrity
 - valuable data not changed undetectably
 - Secrecy
 - secret information not revealed to some environment
- 

Secrecy example

```
procedure sec{
    int h = HIGH;
    int l = 0;

    ...
    return l;
}
```

sec is **secure** if it returns the same value (l)
for all possible values of HIGH

Higher-order example

```
int f(int x);  
  
procedure sec{  
    int h = HIGH;  
  
    ...  
    int g(int y) {  
        ...  
        }  
        return g;  
}
```

sec is secure if ... ?

Higher-order example

```
int f(int x);  
  
procedure sec{  
    int h = HIGH;  
  
    ...  
  
    int g(int y) {  
  
        ...  
        }  
        return g;  
    }
```


sec is secure if ... ?

General case

P : a program depending on secret variable h .

P is **secure** for h if, for all v, v' ,

$$P(h=v) \approx P(h=v')$$





General case

P : a program depending on secret variable h .

P is **secure** for h if, for all v, v' ,

$$P(h=v) \approx P(h=v')$$



non-interference

Program semantics

What does $P(h=v) \simeq P(h=v')$ mean?

Program semantics

What does $P(h=v) \approx P(h=v')$ mean?

- related to program meaning:
 - Syntax
 - Machine code
 - Input/output function
 - Abstract procedure
 - Logic rules
 - ...
 - **Observable behaviour**

Observational equivalence

$$P \simeq P'$$

- if P and P' have the same observable behaviour
- i.e. if, for any **computational context** $C(-)$,
 $C(P)$ terminates $\Leftrightarrow C(P')$ terminates

Capturing equivalence



How do we establish $P \simeq P'$?

Capturing equivalence

How do we establish $P \simeq P'$?

- Externally: look at all possible contexts $C(-)$
 - too many contexts – *infeasible*
- Internally: look at P
 - too many 'behaviours' – *incomplete*



Computation as a game



Computation: a 2-player game

- Proponent
- Opponent

Computation as a game



Computation: a 2-player game

- Proponent
- Opponent

- Combines external with internal view
- into a single description

Full Abstraction

Full abstraction

Define a semantics function:

$$\mu : \text{Syntax} \longrightarrow U$$

such that:

$$P \simeq P' \Leftrightarrow \mu(P) = \mu(P')$$

Full abstraction

Define a semantics function:

$$\mu : \text{Syntax} \longrightarrow U$$

such that:

$$P \simeq P' \Leftrightarrow \mu(P) = \mu(P')$$

Game semantics is fully abstract

Game Semantics

- Computation is modelled as a 2-player game between:
 - *Opponent* (the environment)
 - *Proponent* (the program)

Example games

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

Example games

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

O call(f, 5)

Example games

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

O call (f , 5)
 P ret (6)

Example games

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

O call(f, 5)
P ret(6)

O call(f, 6)
P ret(7)

Example games

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

O call(f, 5)
P ret(6)

O call(f, 6)
P ret(7)

⋮

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

O call(add1, 5)

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

O call (add1, 5)
P call (f, 5)

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

O call (add1, 5)
P call (f, 5)
O ret (3)

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

<i>O</i>	call (add1, 5)
<i>P</i>	call (f, 5)
<i>O</i>	ret (3)
<i>P</i>	ret (4)

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

O call (add1, 5)
P call (f, 5)
O ret (3)
P ret (4)

O call (add1, 6)
P call (f, 6)
O ret (1)
P ret (2)

⋮

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

$c(i)$ $c_f(i)$ $r_f(j)$ $r(j+1)$...
 O P O P

O	call (add1, 5)
P	call (f, 5)
O	ret (3)
P	ret (4)

O	call (add1, 6)
P	call (f, 6)
O	ret (1)
P	ret (2)

⋮

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1a(int x) {  
    return ???;  
}
```

<i>O</i>	call (add1a, 5)
<i>P</i>	call (f, 5)
<i>O</i>	ret (3)
<i>P</i>	call (f, 3)
<i>O</i>	ret (13)
<i>P</i>	ret (14)

⋮

Example games

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1a(int x) {  
    return f(f(x))+1;  
}
```

O	call (add1a, 5)
P	call (f, 5)
O	ret (3)
P	call (f, 3)
O	ret (13)
P	ret (14)

$c(i)$	$c_f(i)$	$r_f(j)$	$c_f(j)$	$r_f(k)$	$r(k+1)$	\dots
O	P	O	P	O	P	

:

Composition

```
int f(int y);  
  
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

Composition

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

```
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```

Composition

f

O	call (f, 5)
P	ret (6)

O	call (f, 6)
P	ret (7)


add1

O	call (add1, 5)
P	call (f, 5)
O	ret (3)
P	ret (4)




O	call (add1, 6)
P	call (f, 6)
O	ret (1)
P	ret (2)

Composition

add1




f






Composition

add1






f





Composition

add1





Composition

add1





Composition

add1




Composition

add1



⋮

Composition




Composition

		O	call (add1, 5)
O	call (f, 5)	O/P	
P	ret (6)	P/O	
		P	ret (7)
		O	call (add1, 6)
O	call (f, 6)	O/P	
P	ret (7)	P/O	
		P	ret (8)

⋮

Composition



⋮

Composition

O	call (add1, 5)
P	ret (7)

O	call (add1, 6)
P	ret (8)

⋮

Composition

```
int g(int x) {  
    return x+2;  
}
```

$c(i)$ $r(i+2)$...
 O P

O call (add1, 5)
 P ret (7)

O call (add1, 6)
 P ret (8)


⋮

Composition

```
int g(int x) {  
    return x+2;  
}
```

```
int f(int x) {  
    return x+1;  
}
```

```
int add1(int x) {  
    return f(x)+1;  
}
```



Game Semantics

- Computation is modelled as a 2-player game between:
 - *Opponent* (the environment)
 - *Proponent* (the program)
- Qualitative games
- Programs \mapsto *strategies* for Proponent
- Families (i.e. *categories*) of games

Story so far

Pure functions
Integer/ HO state
Non-det./ probability
Exceptions/ control
Recursive types
Polymorphism
Names

Algorithmic games
Abstract interpretation
Control-flow analysis

Access control
Name flow as IF (Information Flow)

- full abstraction
- program analysis
- security

Access control

```
int f(int y);

int sec() {
    int h=HIGH;

    return f(h)+1;
}
```


Access control

```
int f(int y);  
  
int sec() {  
    int h=HIGH;  
  
    return f(h)+1;  
}
```

$c()$ $c_f(i)$ $r_f(j)$ $r(j+1) \dots$
 O P O P

Access control

```
int f(int y);  
  
int sec() {  
    int h=HIGH;  
  
    return f(h)+1;  
}
```



Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

- like int's
- only "=="

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

- the secret is: HIGH1 = HIGH2
- can it be guessed without storing names?

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

$c(f)$ $c_f(n_1)$ $r_f(b_1)$ $c_f(n_2)$ $r_f(b_2)$ $r(b)$

O

P

O

P

O

P

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

$b = (b_1 = b_2)$

$c(f) \ c_f(n_1) \ r_f(b_1) \ c_f(n_2) \ r_f(b_2) \ r(b)$

O

P

O

P

O

P

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```



$$b = (b_1 = b_2)$$

$$c(f) \ c_f(n_1) \ r_f(b_1) \ c_f(n_2) \ r_f(b_2) \ r(b)$$

O

P

O

P

O

P

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

$b=(b_1=b_2)$

$c(f) \ c_f(n_1) \ r_f(b_1) \ c_f(n_2) \ r_f(b_2) \ r(b)$

$c(f) \ c_f(n_1) \ c(f_1) \ c_{f_1}(n_1) \dots$

$O \quad P \quad O \quad P \quad O \quad P$

Name flow

```
int sec( name=>int f ) {  
    name h1=HIGH1;  
    name h2=HIGH2;  
  
    return (f(h1)==f(h2))  
}
```

$c(f)$ $c_f(n_1)$

$c(f)$ $c_f(n_1)$

O P

```
int i=0;  
  
int f(name x) {  
    int f1(name y) {  
        if (x==y) return 0;  
        i=1; return 1;  
    }  
    return sec(f1);  
}
```

What's next

Pure functions
Integer/ HO state
Non-det./ probability
Exceptions/ control
Recursive types
Polymorphism
Names

- full abstraction
- program analysis
- security

Algorithmic games
Abstract interpretation
Control-flow analysis
Access control
Name flow as IF
Quantitative IF

Further reading

- Samson Abramsky, Radha Jagadeesan: *Game Semantics for Access Control*. MFPS 2009: 135-156.
- Dan R. Ghica: *Applications of Game Semantics: From Program Analysis to Hardware Synthesis*. LICS 2009: 17-26.
- Pasquale Malacaria, Chris Hankin: *Non-Deterministic Games and Program Analysis: An Application to Security*. LICS 1999: 443-452.
- Nikos Tzevelekos: *Program equivalence in a simple language with state*. Computer Languages, Systems & Structures, 38(2): 181–198, 2012.